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INTRODUCTION1
 
The most powerful type of group of modern times is the nation-state. However, since 
its inglorious heyday in the late 19th and early 20th century, its highly autonomous nature has 
been curbed, externally through the role played by numerous international organisations, 
internally through the decline in popularity of insular protectionism and the 
socialist/communist need to centralise control in the state apparatus, as well as by the growth 
of other centres of power. One such centre of power is the corporation. According to the title 
of one book, they are ‘imperial’,2 according to another, they might rule the world.3 Shell 
Nigeria acts in some ways like a government, spending over $50 million per year in 
infrastructure projects, consulting those affected by its activity in order to ensure, if not its 
                                                     
* School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 
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1 The literature regarding the accountability of corporations is large and growing larger. References have been kept 
to a minimum. More can be found in DM Branson ‘The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational 
Corporations’ (2002) 16 Transnational Lawyer 121. 
2 RJ Barnet and J Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York, 
Touchstone, 1995). 
3 DC Korten, When Corporations Rule the World, 2nd Edition (San Francisco, Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2001). 
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popularity, its acceptance.4 Total sales of the top 20 corporations are more than US$1,600 
billion and they employ more than 5 million people.5
This power should not be exaggerated. Contrary to what some commentators seem to 
imply, particularly when they draw up tables showing corporations as having more economic 
weight than many countries: ‘States remain sovereign. They wield legal powers that no 
individual or corporation can possess.’6 Shell Nigeria’s activities are exceptional. They are 
only undertaken because of the particular capacity problems of the Nigerian state. Shell 
cannot possibly take over all state functions, nor would its management wish to do so. 
It remains true, though, that corporations can exercise great power. In accordance 
with the general principle of checks and balances in society, that power needs to be kept 
within bounds. One type of law which states use for the purpose of such control is the law 
which gives the corporation legal life, its ‘incorporation law’. It is a reasonably obvious 
choice, since it is the law which determines the parameters of the corporation’s existence.7 
However, in a globalised world, states may find their ability to use this type of law seriously 
curtailed, with many corporations able to evade it with relative ease. 
This chapter is mainly concerned with the extent to which corporations can practise 
such evasion and briefly considers the possibility of an alternative approach. 
 
                                                     
4 Shell, Social Investment Overview, available at http://www.shell.com (visited 13 May 2003); Shell SPDC 2002 
Integrated Environment & Community Development Stakeholders’ Workshop Action Close - Out Report (Shell, 
2003). 
5 UNCTAD World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages (New York: United Nations, 2001), cited in H 
Kovach, C Neligan, and S Burall, Power without Accountability? The Global Accountability Report 1 (One World 
Trust, 2003) at 15. For more details, see A Dunlop, ‘Corporate Governance and Transnational Corporations’ in this 
volume. 
6 G Soros, The Crisis of Global Capitalism: Open Society Endangered (London, Little, Brown and Company, 
1998) at 109. 
7 On the numerous other mechanisms which can be used for this purpose, see, for example, H Ward Legal Issues in 
Corporate Citizenship (London, Globalt Ansvar - Swedish Partnership for Global Responsibility, 2003). 
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 FACILITATION AND CONTROL 
 
For our purposes, incorporation law can be considered as having two aspects. The 
first is its facilitative capacity, giving the grouping its legal form and the legal mechanisms 
which enable it to function. The second is its ability to regulate the corporation. 
Until the recent growth in the importance of the corporation, these aspects received 
relatively little attention outside the sphere of company law. Far more attention was paid to 
similar concepts in the context of the nation state, in which facilitative and regulatory 
concepts evolved slowly over time in well-known ways, varying from state to state, with 
much interchange of ideas between countries. Notably there emerged the idea of an entity 
distinct from the person of the monarch, ‘the State’ or ‘the Crown’.8 Control evolved in 
tandem, also over long periods and with much difficulty, including violent upheavals such as 
the Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1639-16519 and the French Revolution 1789. A greater role 
for assemblies led to the concept of different entities within the state, such as ‘the King/Queen 
in Parliament’, ‘the judiciary’ and ‘the executive’, as well as to the separation of those entities 
from each, with the executive being, in theory, supervised and controlled by the other two. 
Political control came to be exercised by the participants in the state through their 
representatives. Legal control came to be exercised by the judges. 
The history of the corporation is quite different. Despite the fact that it has deep 
historical roots, with evidence of ‘company’ type contracts reaching back to the ancient Near 
East, and some corporations such as the East India Company having state-like powers, its 
general significance did not match that of the state for centuries. For this reason, facilitative 
                                                     
8 See, for example, J-M Carbasse, Manuel d’introduction historique au droit (Paris, Presses universitaires de 
France, 2002) at 153; EH Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology 
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957). 
9 More commonly, if inaccurately, known as ‘the English Civil War’. See N Davies, The Isles: A History, 
(London, Macmillan, 1999) at 490. 
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concepts were slow to develop beyond such ancient ideas as the commenda contract/company 
on the European mainland (a kind of limited partnership, in which one party contributed 
capital and the other commercial expertise, the investor’s liability in the venture being limited 
to the capital contributed; it gave rise to statutory equivalents in civilian legal systems) and 
the more recent, if still venerable, trust in England.10
It was only after the Industrial Revolution, when advances in technology allowed and 
required the mass concentration and exploitation of resources, that the corporation became a 
major force. Without wishing to minimise the importance of the long history during which the 
component ideas were developed, it is not too inaccurate to point to this period as the turning 
point in facilitative ideas, because it is when the major such idea, incorporation, was made 
easily available to the general population by simple registration.11
On the regulatory side the nation-state was concerned to submit corporations to its 
control and prevent them from threatening the power of the state by becoming ‘independent 
commonwealths within the kingdom’.12 An important method used in the taming process was 
the assumption by the nation-state of the leading role in giving legal form to corporations. In 
the common law, one way of achieving this was the reservation to the state of the grant of 
                                                     
10 For a history of the commenda and its relationship to other similar contracts, see JH Pryor ‘The Origins of the 
Commenda Contract’, (1977) 52 Speculum 5. On companies as contracts and in particular the French approach to 
this issue, see NHD Foster 'Company Law Theory - England and France'  (2000) 48 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 573-621 at 585-6 and 596-600. 
11 The first significant enactment in the UK was the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844. Limited liability was 
introduced after many debates by the Limited Liability Act 1855. Much of what we think of as characteristic of the 
UK company was introduced later, by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. In France the Code Civil of 1804 and 
the Commercial Code of 1807 made very little provision for companies. The first extensive regulation was 
contained in the Law of 24 July 1867, Art 21 of which was the first provision allowing sociétés anonymes to be 
formed without specific authorisation of the Conseil d’Etat. Corporate legislation was passed by various states of 
the United States throughout the early to mid-19th century, starting with New York in 1811. 
12 Sir Robert Sawyer, the Attorney-General, in proceedings in 1682 (8 ST 1039), cited in W Holdsworth A History 
of English Law, 3rd Edition (London, Methuen, 1924) Vol 9 at 46. 
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legal personality (the ‘concession theory’); in French law legal personality is granted by case-
law, but in practice registration is a pre-requisite to this recognition as far as companies are 
concerned.13 Whatever the theoretical method used, the state gave itself the power to impose 
restrictions on corporations by incorporating those restrictions into the very structure of their 
legal existence. 
 
 
THE ENTERPRISE, THE LEGAL ENTITY AND THE MISMATCH 
 
There are, however, fundamental problems with the approach to regulation just described. In 
order to understand them it is necessary to understand the nature of the corporation, the way 
in which it takes legal form, and the separation which took place between the real-world 
grouping (which will be called, from this point on, the ‘enterprise’) and the legal construct 
which was created in order to give it legal standing (the ‘legal entity’). 
 
 
The Enterprise 
 
The enterprise is what the lay person thinks of as the corporation, in other words (roughly 
speaking) a group of people acting with a common purpose for commercial gain. Examples of 
such groups are IBM, Microsoft and Shell. Space does not permit a detailed ontological 
analysis. Suffice it to say that it can be regarded as a unit for everyday purposes, despite being 
made up of various human and other components. This approach is justifiable because the 
group has a kind of reality, constituted by a difference between the outcomes possible with a 
coordinated group and those which are possible with an uncoordinated collection of 
                                                     
13 Cass civ 2e 28  janv 1954: D1954, 2, 217, note Levasseur: ‘la personnnalité civile n'est pas une création de la 
loi, qu'elle appartient, en principe, à tout groupement pourvu d'un possibilité d'expression collective pour la 
défense d'intérêts licites, dignes, par suite, d'être juridiquement reconnues et protégés.’ 
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individuals. The outcomes are of two types, internal and external. Internal outcomes are 
manifested by the changed behaviour of the participants in the enterprise. External outcomes 
are manifested by the effects which the group actions of the enterprise produce on the rest of 
the world. 
 
Figure 1: The Enteprise14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to avoid complication, the relationships between the participants are not 
shown. The shading represents a role which that person has in the organisation. Those people 
with horizontal lines have contributed capital. Those with vertical lines are managers. Those 
with diagonal lines are employees. Note that one person can combine various roles. 
 
                                                     
14 Thanks are due to a traveller on the 1845 Victoria to Epsom train for his comments on the diagram. 
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 The Legal Entity 
 
The legal entity has a different reality. Unlike the enterprise, which is composed of parts 
which have a physical existence, the legal entity is a pure abstraction with no physical parts, 
an invention of the law. It has a certain reality which, like that of the enterprise, derives from 
a difference in outcomes as between its ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’. With the legal entity, 
though, the difference is determined by the law. If the law determines that ‘a company exists’, 
this in fact means that the participants in ‘the company’ have different rights and obligations 
from those which they would have had if ‘the company did not exist’. In other words, going 
through the formalities of ‘company formation’ results in different legal outcomes for the 
participants than those which would have obtained if the formalities had not been observed. 
Examples of the legal entity include IBM United Kingdom Holdings Limited, Microsoft 
System Sales UK Limited and Shell & BP Services Limited. 
In the legal entity the messiness of the enterprise is artificially tidied up. The roles of 
the participants are referred to in the language of the legal entity as if they were people 
(‘shareholders’, ‘directors’ and ‘employees’). Different rights and obligations are assigned to 
those roles. The legal entity can be represented as follows. 
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Figure 2: The Legal Entity 
 
 
 
Rectangles denote roles, the concept of the legal entity is represented by the circle. 
that of shares by an oval. This diagram is based on an English company, hence the position of 
the employees and the relationship of the company to the assets. In other jurisdictions the 
employees would be well to the left of the dotted line. 
The difference between the reality of the enterprise and that of the legal entity 
resulted in a split between the two. The legal entity, originally designed to be the legal 
clothing of the enterprise, can be used simply to alter the legal relationships between 
individuals who ‘form a company’ as amongst themselves and as between them and other 
individuals in the complete absence of any underlying enterprise. To take the example of a 
company with limited liability, I can form a single shareholder company which borrows £100 
from you. Effectively, I have borrowed the money, there is nobody else involved in the 
company and there is no enterprise behind it. However, so long as there are no circumstances 
Legal EntityShareholders Shares 
Assets
Management
Employees
Creditors 
The outside world The company 
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present which might allow the ‘veil of incorporation’ to be lifted, if the company fails to pay 
you, I am not liable.15
 
 
The Mismatch 
 
Once the distinct and separate nature of the legal entity was realised, it became possible to 
create the various types of legal entities which we have today, disconnected (either wholly or 
partially) from any real enterprise, entities which we call ‘subsidiaries’, ‘dormant companies’, 
‘off-the-shelf companies’ and so on. This is not to say that there is no link between enterprises 
and legal entities. Most enterprises act through one or more legal entities and many legal 
entities are connected in some way to an enterprise. 
A consequence of the difference in the natures of the two phenomena is the difference 
in their relationship to the nation-state. 
The legal entity is a creation of the law, that is, of a jurisdiction, therefore its nature is 
inevitability jurisdictional, therefore national or sub-national.16 As the European Court of 
Justice put it: ‘unlike natural persons, companies exist only by virtue of the national legal 
system which governs their incorporation and operation.’17
                                                     
15 It is this dichotomy between the reality of the enterprise and the reality of the legal entity which is at the heart of 
Salomon v A Salomon & Company, Limited [1897] AC 22, HL(E). See in particular the arguments of counsel at 
27, where he refers to the desire of Aron Salomon: ‘to convert his unlimited into a limited liability.’ 
16 Although not strictly correct, the word ‘national’ has been used here in preference to ‘municipal’ to denote the 
law of a jurisdiction, since the impetus for corporate regulation comes from the nation-state, and ‘municipal’ could 
be construed as referring to a sub-division of the nation-state. 
17 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH C208/00, ECJ at §18, citing The 
Queen v Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust [1988] ECR 
5483, ECJ. A legal entity can, of course, have a link with another jurisdiction if its human actors conduct activities 
there. 
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The enterprise, though, is only artificially definable by reference to a nation-state. As 
the privatising governments of the Thatcher era discovered, in a globalised world without 
foreign exchange, ownership, or management restrictions, capital has neither nationality nor 
passport, and management can be of any nationality, as can employees. So enterprises are 
essentially non-national: 
 
For business purposes the boundaries that separate one nation from another are no 
more real than the equator. They are merely convenient demarcations of ethnic, 
linguistic and cultural entities.18
 
                                                     
18 A former IBM executive, quoted in T Nairn, ‘Internationalism and the Second Coming’, (1993) 122 Daedalus 
155 at 157, quoted in turn in L Cao, ‘Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking U.S. 
Trade Laws’, (2002) 90 California Law Review 401 at 403. 
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The non-national nature of the enterprise can be roughly represented as follows. 
 
Figure 3: The Relationship of the Enterprise to Jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
The Enterprise
 
 
 
The dotted lines indicate some real-world link to the jurisdiction in question, such as 
a business activity in that place. 
The link between a legal entity and its jurisdiction can be represented as follows. 
 
   
Jurisdiction A Jurisdiction B Jurisdiction C 
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Figure 4: The Relationship of the Legal Entity to its Jurisdiction of Incorporation 
 
 
 
 
Legal 
Entity 
 
 
The thick line represents the legal link to the jurisdiction of incorporation, the 
jurisdiction which gives it existence. A legal entity can, of course, have a link with another 
jurisdiction if its human actors conduct activities there. This can be represented as follows. 
 
Figure 5: The Relationship of the Legal Entity to its Jurisdiction of Incorporation and other 
Jurisdictions 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal 
Entity 
 
Jurisdiction A 
 
Jurisdiction B 
 
Jurisdiction A 
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The dotted line represents a real world connection to another jurisdiction. 
Since most enterprises use legal entities as their legal representation, a more accurate 
picture is given by combining Figures 4 and 5, as set out below (Figure 6). In this diagram, 
the dotted lines represent a real-world connection of some sort, which in the case of the 
enterprise passes through the legal entities. 
 
Figure 6: The Relationship of the Enterprise and its Legal Entity to Jurisdictions. 
 
The Enterprise
 
Legal 
Entity 1 
Legal 
Entity 2 
 
 
The fact that the enterprise is non-national and the legal entity national poses a 
regulatory problem. Enterprises can in theory choose their incorporation law, and therefore 
the degree of control exercised by it, so long as they can find a ‘host’ jurisdiction prepared to 
allow them to incorporate in that jurisdiction. 
   
Jurisdiction A Jurisdiction B Jurisdiction C 
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The ability of an enterprise to shop around in this way should not be exaggerated. If 
it wishes to incorporate, it must choose at least one jurisdiction in which to do so, and 
sometimes will be obliged, either by legal or commercial constraints, to be represented by a 
legal entity in a jurisdiction with a more onerous incorporation law than it would wish. 
However, the possible consequences of the evasion of incorporation law regulation by choice 
of incorporation jurisdiction do merit consideration. 
 
 
VARIETIES OF NATIONAL CONTROL 
 
Since corporate regulation effected by incorporation law is still national, it can vary quite 
significantly from one jurisdiction to another. These variations derive from different 
conceptions of the role of groups in general and the role of enterprises in particular, and result 
in incorporation law regimes of two main types: the Civilians and the Commoners. The 
Civilians and the Commoners, tracing their ancestry respectively, in the first instance, to 
France and England, and at a later stage influenced by German and United States ideas, 
inhabit two different mental, cultural and ideological worlds.19
We must be careful not to exaggerate the differences between the two traditions, for 
both include a high degree of regulation. However, those differences are significant, it being 
fair to say, as a broad generalisation, that the common law conception of the enterprise is of 
                                                     
19 A few Neutrals, such as China, pick and choose. For an overview of company law worldwide, see C Jordan, An 
International Survey of Companies Law in the Commonwealth, North America, Asia And Europe (London, DTI, 
1998). On its spread, see K Pistor, Y Keinan, J Kleinheisterkamp and MD West, ‘The Evolution of Corporate Law: 
A Cross-Country Comparison’, (2002 ) 23 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 791. 
The efficacy of transplanting company law is not discussed herein. On this issue, see, for example, (on Russia) B 
Black and R Kraakman, ‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’, (1996) 109 Harvard Law Review 1911; 
(Slovakia, China and Vietnam) C Jordan, Law Matters: Corporate Governance Law Reforms (2000), available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/corpgov/core_course/core_pdfs/jordan_lawmatters.ppt. 
14  
an essentially private grouping while the civilians view it as quasi-public.20 These divergent 
conceptions of the role of the enterprise in society give us different conceptions of the 
enterprise itself. 
In the common law world, private interests should be allowed free rein unless there 
are pressing reasons to restrict them. In particular, primacy is given to the private interests of 
the investors/‘owners’. 
In the civilian tradition, it is more important to protect public than private interests. 
The enterprise is viewed as part of a regulated economy in which one of its functions is to 
provide social benefits, such as employment, for citizens.21 Notably, many civilian systems 
have: some attempt to ensure that legal entities have an enterprise, or something resembling 
it, underlying them, notably by imposing minimum capital requirements (intended to ensure 
that the underlying enterprise is properly capitalised, thereby protecting creditors from the 
risks of an insufficiently funded venture); a recognition criterion based on the place of activity 
rather than on the place of incorporation (the doctrine of the ‘seat’, based on the assumption 
that the attempt to ensure that there is an enterprise underlying the legal entity has worked);22 
and extensive involvement and protection of employees. 
                                                     
20 The words ‘public’ and ‘private’ need some clarification. ‘Private’ means that the legal system considers the 
company to concern only the individuals who make it up, much as a contract is normally considered to concern the 
parties to it, and not others; ‘public’ means that the legal system considers the company as constituting a powerful 
body which can affect non-participants, and therefore has a responsibility to those non-participants and a need to 
be controlled. The words are not to be taken in their French technical legal sense, in which companies are private 
law institutions, as opposed to public law legal persons such as the state, hospitals and universities. 
For the US literature, see A Wolfe, ‘The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?’ (1993) 50 
Washington and Lee Law Review 1673 at 1673-74. On the different ideologies of public and private law, see J W 
Singer, ‘The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld’, (1982) Wisconsin Law 
Review 975 at 982-83. 
21 On the different approaches of the common law and civilian traditions to economic freedom, see PG Mahoney, 
‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’, (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 503. 
22 For a discussion of the different recognition theories, see R Drury, ‘The Regulation and Recognition of Foreign 
Corporations: Responses to the Delaware Syndrome’, [1998] CLJ 165 at 168-75. 
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The doctrine of the seat needs some more explanation.23 There is considerable 
variation among those jurisdictions which have it. Only Germany and France will be 
examined here. 
In France, Art 1837 Civil Code provides that companies which have their seat on 
French territory are subject to French law. The seat must be ‘real’, and this reality will be 
determined by the court. For example, if the French court comes to the conclusion that a seat 
abroad is a sham, and that the real seat is in France, it will apply French law. This is supposed 
to permit policing of companies by criminal penalties, since those penalties are only effective 
if the seat is in the jurisdiction in which the penalties are imposed. In Germany, the legal 
capacity of a company is determined by the law of the place where its administration is 
established, its seat. In order to enjoy legal capacity a company which transfers its 
administration to Germany must be reincorporated in Germany.24 The doctrine: 
 
prevents the provisions of company law in the State in which the actual centre of 
administration is situated, which are intended to protect certain vital interests, from 
being circumvented by incorporating the company abroad.25
 
Other systems (notably those of the common law, but a few civilian systems have 
similar attitudes in some areas), take a different view. English law, for example, is not 
concerned to ensure that the legal entity has any significant ‘reality’ in the sense of there 
being a substantial enterprise underlying it, so long as the formal minimum requirements are 
                                                     
23 See PJ Omar, ‘Centros Revisited: Assessing the Impact on Corporate Organisation in Europe’, (2000) 11 ICCLR 
407 at 408; PJ Omar, ‘Centros Redux: Conflict at the Heart of European Company Law’, (2002) 13 ICCLR 448 at 
449-50 and The High Level Group of Company Law Experts A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law 
in Europe: A Consultative Document of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts (Brussels, European 
Union, 2002) at 32-34. 
24 Per the ECJ in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH C208/00, ECJ at §5. 
25 Per the ECJ in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH C208/00, ECJ at §16. 
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met (one person who acts as a member/director and one person who acts as a secretary, the 
filing of accounts and other documents, etc).26 Nor does it base any control mechanism on any 
requirements for, or assumptions about, such a reality. A prime example of this attitude is the 
complete absence of any minimum capital requirement for private companies. Recognition of 
foreign legal entities is based on their place of incorporation and there is no concept of the 
seat, let alone any attempt to use such a concept to regulate the enterprise by ensuring that the 
legal entity is subject to the control of the incorporation law of the jurisdiction concerned. 
There is little, if any, employee participation or protection. These attitudes result in 
considerable advantages for the incorporator. In England and Wales, for example: 
 
the shares do not have to be fully paid up, formation is much quicker, no prior 
examination of the constitution is necessary and the conditions governing the 
amendment of the constitutive documents, the transfer of shares and publicity are less 
strict.27
 
Having reached this point, a qualification of what has just been said is necessary. The 
divide between common law and civilian law is very rough, for there is considerable 
variation. For example, of the civilian jurisdictions in the European Union, Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands and Sweden do not have the ‘seat’ doctrine.28 Germany has a group liability 
concept which is useful for the protection of other stakeholders, but which is not found 
elsewhere.29
                                                     
26 All of these can be corporate bodies, in which case the ‘reality’ underlying the legal entity is tenuous. 
27 See Advocate-General Alper’s opinion in Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art 
Ltd C167/01, ECJ at III, 4. 
28 Those which do have it include Austria, France, Germany and Luxembourg: PJ Omar, ‘Centros Revisited: 
Assessing the Impact on Corporate Organisation in Europe’, (2000) 11 ICCLR 407 at 407. 
29 See J Peter, ‘Parent Liability in German and British Law: Too Far Apart for EU Legislation?’ (1999) European 
Business Law Review 440. 
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RACING TO THE BOTTOM? CENTROS, ÜBERSEERING AND INSPIRE ART30
 
The mismatch between (i) the non-national nature of the enterprise and (ii) its local legal 
manifestation, combined with the new extension of the freedom of the enterprise to pick and 
choose jurisdictions, could eventually lead to the predominance of the attitudes of one model 
of incorporation law, or at least to a considerable conflict between those models. 
In the United States, the mismatch between states and enterprises famously led to a 
‘race to the bottom’, in which state legal systems competed for incorporation and other 
business by attempting to provide the corporate law regime which is most attractive to 
incorporators, a race won by Delaware.31 The United States model is interesting, but evolved 
as a result of competition among very similar common law systems. More pertinent, perhaps, 
are the Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art cases, which provide, in the exaggerated setting 
of a legal right to establishment granted by European Union law, examples of a direct 
confrontation between common law and civilian concepts. 
All the cases concerned Art 43 and 48 EC Treaty. Pursuant to these articles, 
companies enjoy the same freedom of establishment within the European Economic Area as 
individuals, and Member States may not restrict that freedom (with limited exceptions). To 
                                                     
30 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen C212/97 [2000] Ch 446, ECJ; Überseering BV v Nordic 
Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH C208/00, ECJ; Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor 
Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd C167/01, ECJ. Numerous commentaries on the Centros case include P J Omar, 
‘Centros Revisited: Assessing the Impact on Corporate Organisation in Europe’, (2000) 11 ICCLR 407; 
commentaries on the Überseering case include W H Roth, ‘From Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of 
Companies, Private International Law, and Community Law’, [2003] ICLQ 177 and E Micheler, ‘Recognition of 
Companies Incorporated in Other EU Member States’, [2003] ICLQ 521, in which the Inspire Art case is also 
discussed; a casenote on the Inspire Art case is H De Wulf and S Dejonghe, ‘Netherlands Company Law - 
Corporate Seats’ (2004) 15 ICCLR N29-30. See also Commission of the European Communities v Portugal Case 
C-171/02, ECJ, Apr 29, 2004, in which a minimum capital requirement for security firms wishing to set up 
business in Portugal was found to be in breach of Art 43 EC (§54 of the judgment). 
31 The principal issues are discussed in ME Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’, (1989) 89 Columbia 
Law Review 1461 at 1505-14. 
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qualify, companies must have one or more of their place of incorporation, principal place of 
administration, or principal place of business, in a Member State, and must be set up to make 
a profit. 
In the Centros case, two Danish nationals and residents incorporated Centros Limited 
in England and Wales with a nominal capital of £100, which was not paid up. The company 
applied to set up a branch in Denmark. The Danish Trade and Companies Board refused the 
application on the grounds that the only reason for incorporating the company in England and 
Wales was to avoid the onerous minimum capital requirements of Danish law (DKK200,000, 
about €27,000 or £19,300 at the time of writing). On a reference by the Danish Supreme 
Court to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ held that the motive 
did not remove the company’s right to freedom of establishment. 
The Centros case concerned capital requirements, not the seat, although it seemed to 
many that the demise of the doctrine was an inevitable consequence of the decision. The 
Überseering case did directly raise the question of the seat. Überseering BV (‘Überseering’), 
incorporated in the Netherlands, owned buildings in Germany. In 1992 Überseering engaged 
a German company, Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
(‘Baumanagement’) to renovate the buildings. In 1994 two German nationals and residents 
acquired all the shares in Überseering. Überseering was dissatisfied with the standard of work 
and sued Baumanagement in 1996, alleging breach of contract. 
The German courts reasoned as follows: the legal capacity of a company is 
determined by the law of the place where its administration is established; the acquisition of 
the shares by the German nationals meant that the administration of Überseering was 
transferred to Germany; hence its legal capacity was determined by German law; under 
German law, in order to enjoy legal capacity a company which transfers its administration to 
Germany must be reincorporated in Germany;32 and Überseering had not been reincorporated 
in Germany. Therefore it did not have legal capacity in Germany. 
                                                     
32 Per the ECJ in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH C208/00, ECJ at §5. 
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The ECJ, however, held that this conclusion was contrary to the principle of freedom 
of establishment, despite the German government’s arguments that the seat doctrine protected 
creditors (by ensuring a minimum share capital), minority shareholders and employees, and 
prevented tax evasion. The court did furnish a caveat: 
 
It is not inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to the general interest, 
such as the protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees 
and even the taxation authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject to certain 
conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment. 
 
But the court went straight on to say: 
 
Such objectives cannot, however, justify denying the legal capacity and, 
consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of a company properly 
incorporated in another Member State in which it has its registered office. Such a 
measure is tantamount to an outright negation of the freedom of establishment 
conferred on companies by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC.33
 
The Inspire Art case is of dual interest. Not only does it provide a further example of 
a common law legal entity being used in preference in a civilian type, it also furnishes us with 
an instance of possible civilian countermeasures. Inspire Art Limited was incorporated in 
England and Wales solely in order to benefit from the perceived advantages of English 
incorporation law over the incorporation law of the Netherlands. The Netherlands legislature 
had enacted the Pure Form Foreign Companies Act 1997 specifically in order to deal with the 
phenomenon of such Delaware and English ‘pseudo-foreign’ companies.34 The Act provided 
                                                     
33 At §92. 
34 See §31 of the opinion of Advocate General Alper. 
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that companies with ‘no real connection with [their state of incorporation]’ (Art 1) had to 
register as a ‘foreign pure form company’ (Art 2), publicise this status (Art 3), and comply 
with the Dutch minimum capital requirements (Art 4). Non-compliance was punishable by the 
imposition of personal liability on the company directors (Art 4). The ECJ came to the 
conclusion that: 
 
It is contrary to Articles 43 EC and 48 EC for national legislation … to impose on the 
exercise of freedom of secondary establishment in that State by a company formed in 
accordance with the law of another Member State certain conditions provided for in 
domestic company law in respect of company formation relating to minimum capital 
and directors’ liability. The reasons for which the company was formed in that other 
Member State, and the fact that it carries on its activities exclusively or almost 
exclusively in the Member State of establishment, do not deprive it of the right to 
invoke the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the EC Treaty, save where the 
existence of an abuse is established on a case-by-case basis.35
 
In the EU, the ECJ’s caveat to its decision in Überseering36 may provide an escape 
route of sorts for the seat doctrine, but it is submitted that the caveat should be read 
restrictively, and that Paul Omar’s description of the effect of the judgement as an 
‘earthquake in jurisprudential terms in the German-speaking world’ will prove to be correct in 
terms of practice as well.37 This seems to be confirmed by the Inspire Art case, since the 
Dutch court and the German, Dutch and Austrian governments argued specifically that the 
                                                     
35 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd C167/01, ECJ, Nov 15, 2003, §142. 
36 See footnote 29 above. 
37 PJ Omar, ‘Centros Revisited: Assessing the Impact on Corporate Organisation in Europe’, (2000) 11 ICCLR 
407 at 407. 
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Dutch measures contested in Inspire Art were justified by the exception, and this argument 
was rejected.38
More generally, the cases can be interpreted as showing that, in a straight contest 
between common law and the more protective type of civilian law attitude, the common law 
has a distinct advantage. Add to this the predominance of United States (and, to a lesser 
extent, English/UK) ideas in legal globalisation, and the existence of micro-states eager to 
cash in on any opportunity to gain registration income, legal-organisational bio-diversity 
seems threatened, as does the long-term survival of a stricter corporate regulatory regime, for: 
 
the company’s founding members are placed at an advantage, since they are able, 
when choosing the place of incorporation, to choose the legal system which suits 
them best.39
 
In other words, these examples seem to show that attempts to regulate the enterprise 
using incorporation law on a national level may founder in an environment where enterprises 
have the freedom to establish themselves elsewhere. In order to avoid any inconvenient 
regulation all the enterprise has to do is incorporate in another jurisdiction with less restrictive 
incorporation law. Such a result is one that regulators in both the common law and civilian 
traditions, whatever their differences concerning the degree and manner of regulation which is 
appropriate, would presumably wish to avoid. 
 
                                                     
38 See §63ff and §155(2) of Advocate-General Alper’s opinion, §82, §86 and §§95-99 of the judgment. See also 
The High Level Group of Company Law Experts, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a 
Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (Brussels, European Union, 2002) at 102: ‘for a 
Member State to adopt a version of the real seat doctrine which automatically denies recognition to a company 
which has its “real seat” in a country than that of its incorporation was a disproportionate measure which can never 
be justified’ (footnote omitted). Eva Micheler discusses even more wide-ranging possibilities. E Micheler, 
‘Recognition of Companies Incorporated in Other EU Member States’, [2003] ICLQ 521 at 529. 
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 MATCHING THE REGULATION TO THE REGULATED 
 
This conclusion may be alarmist, for the degree to which company law can be harmonised 
worldwide is controversial. In the closely related field of corporate governance, for example, 
many commentators see considerable cultural resistance to Anglo-Saxon pressures.40 It must 
also be said that, to date, few large enterprises have taken advantage of the possibilities of 
regulatory evasion.41 It is also important to note that, once an enterprise is established in a 
given jurisdiction it may be difficult, expensive or both to change (to ‘migrate’).42 However, 
if it does turn out that common law ideas spread and dominate, which, it is submitted, is at 
least a distinct possibility, incorporation law may well have serious limitations as a means of 
corporate regulation in a globalised environment. Two questions then arise: 
 
¾ Can national non-incorporation law perform the necessary regulatory function? 
 
¾ What role is there for international regulation? 
                                                                                                                                                       
39 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH C208/00, ECJ at §15. 
40 See AN Licht, ‘International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to Convergence’, 
(1998) 20 Cardozo Law Review 227 at 227 (comparing corporate governance to securities market law). But see 
DM Branson, ‘The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance’, (2001) 34 
Cornell International Law Journal 321. 
41 According to Branson: ‘A vexing conundrum has been precisely why so few, if any multinationals have moved 
to an offshore incorporating state. Scholars have raised the possibility of a “bandit” multinational moving off shore 
but it seems not to have occurred.’ DM Branson, ‘The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in 
Corporate Governance’, (2001) 34 Cornell International Law Journal 321 at 357. The cases that have come before 
the European Court of Justice seem to confirm this. However, this is not to say that the issue is irrelevant just 
because it concerns small enterprises, nor that it could not concern larger enterprises in the future. 
42 On migration within the European Union see J Bisacre, ‘The Migration of Companies Within the European 
Union and the Proposed Fourteenth Company Law Directive’ [2001] ICLQ 251. 
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 As regards the first possibility, similar problems arise to those encountered in 
incorporation law. The enterprise remains non-national in nature, whereas regulation is 
territorial. Once again, we must not exaggerate, for the vast majority of enterprises are 
obliged to operate within jurisdictions in which their activities are highly regulated. But there 
are many, particularly the largest, which can at least partially evade regulation, for example 
by moving some functions to low labour cost and low labour regulation jurisdictions. 
Deficiencies of national regulation lead naturally to thoughts of international action. 
However, here too the mismatch between the non-national nature of the enterprise with 
national regulation causes problems. Even though the term is often used, international 
regulation is not effective supra (above, or over) nations, and therefore, at least arguably, over 
everyone and every body/grouping in or across nations, including non-national enterprises.43 
It is made and enforced inter (among) nations, because the makers of international law, and 
the components of international organisations, are nation-states. Agreement must come from 
them and norms must be enforced by them. An international solution would therefore only 
work if there were to be a very broad, if not worldwide, consensus on the entire content of 
incorporation law and the conflict of law rules which deal with recognition of legal entities, 
otherwise an enterprise could simply avoid the regulatory net by incorporating in one of the 
states not party to the multilateral effort. However, the profound ideological divide between 
the two traditions constitutes a considerable obstacle to the formation of such a consensus. If 
decades of concerted efforts have failed to bridge the divide on employee participation in the 
relatively narrow forum of the European Union,44 it is hard to see how agreement could be 
reached on a broader range of issues on a worldwide basis.45
                                                     
43 Some would argue that European Union law is an exception. Even in this case, however, the law is ultimately 
based on agreement between member states. 
44 The main, and failed, document was the Draft 5th Directive on Company Law. For a recent instalment of the 
saga, see the National Works Councils Directive (Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the 
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None of this seems to bode very well for the prospects of the regulation of the 
enterprise through incorporation law. However, there may be an alternative solution, which 
can be found by reconsidering the fundamental problem underlying all the possibilities so far 
considered. The 19th century nation-state based method of using incorporation law to regulate 
enterprises has led us to a dead end because it attempts to regulate the non-national enterprise 
by regulating the national legal entity, failing to take into account the mismatch between the 
natures of the enterprise and the legal entity and the consequences of the mismatch for 
regulation. It would seem logical, therefore, to abandon vain attempts to regulate A by 
regulating B, and match the regulation to the regulated by controlling the enterprise directly. 
This suggestion poses all sorts of difficulties, given the elusive nature of the 
enterprise. However, there are indications of a readiness to use this approach, such as the 
common use of the word ‘undertaking’ by the European Union,46 and it is familiar to 
accountants, tax lawyers and tax authorities. It has the advantage of dealing with the reality of 
the situation and of side-stepping at least some of the problems created by existence of two, 
conceptually different, models of incorporation law.47 It is submitted that this method would 
at least constitute a sound base from which to tackle this admittedly difficult task. It would at 
                                                                                                                                                       
European Community), due to be implemented by March 2005, but which may not be fully implemented in the 
UK until 2008. 
45 A possible alternative to a binding multilateral agreement is a code of conduct. But reaching agreement could be 
just as difficult, and even if agreement were reached, it would suffer from an exaggerated form of one of the 
fundamental problems of regulation: the conscientious abide by regulations, while the ruthless and the sloppy 
ignore them. 
46 Defined for UK company law use by s 259(1) Companies Act 1985, and linked to the complex definition of a 
subsidiary in s 258. Other issues that might arise, such as the legitimacy of any international body regulating 
enterprises, are more problematical. Might corporations invoke a principle of ‘no regulation without 
representation’? 
47 Related thinking is to be found in the idea of the ‘Centre of Main Interest’ (COMI) contained in Art 3(1) 
Regulation on Cross-Border Insolvency (Reg 1346/2000) which relies to a considerable extent on the enterprise 
concept, even if it is in a sense the mirror image of what is proposed, since it determines the legal order applicable 
for the insolvent legal entity by reference to the activity of the enterprise underlying it. 
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least be preferable to relying on the fundamentally flawed idea of the enterprise and the legal 
entity being inevitably linked. 
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